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HELPING STUDENTS WHO CAN'T HELP
THEMSELVES: SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD FOR TITLE
IX PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has long held that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate." 1
Although that infamous case of the black armbands 2 was
referencing student freedom of speech, the same could be said
for other student rights, including the right to be free from
sexual harassment in the school environment. The courts have
struggled long and hard over how to classify the public school
arena for a variety of constitutional issues, and have settled on
the idea that it is a unique environment with its own set of
rights and duties, and its own species of litigation therein.
Among those rights and duties are special duties held by school
officials and administrators. In exploring the extent of
students' Fourth Amendment constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
emphasized that the State's power over schoolchildren is
"custodial and tutelary." 3 Then, in T.L.O. v. New Jersey, the
Court went on to say this power requires "close supervision of
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against
conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by
an adult." 4
When these "custodial and tutelary" powers are coupled
with the gravity of compulsory attendance laws, the role of
school administrators and officials takes on added weight.
Mandatory education for all children is established through the

1. Tinker v. Des Moines, :393 U.S. 508, 506 (1968).
2. ld. at 503 (discussing the case of students who wore black armbands on their
sleeves to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam War).
3. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 616, 655 (1995).
4. T.L.O. v. New .Jersey, 169 U.S. 325, :389 (1985).
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common law doctrine of parens patriae, which holds that the
state, through its police power, has the "inherent prerogative to
provide for the commonwealth and individual welfare." 5
Intrinsic to this duty is the role of the guardian, with the
authority to "protect those who are not legally competent to act
in their own behalf." 6 Additionally, the common law doctrine of
in loco parentis vests school administrators and teachers with
"the responsibility of protecting the interests of the child in the
school environment." 7 In sum, there exists the expectation that
the school, and those who operate the school, will take care for
the well-being of each student.
Viewing this concept in the light of peer sexual harassment,
it seems the school has a special duty to ensure a student's
educational opportunities are not hindered by the threat of
unwelcome sexual encounters. The Supreme Court addressed
this duty for the first time in 1999 in Davis v. Monroe. 8
Although the Davis ruling still stands as good law today, it
does not specifically address the special education sector of the
student population at large. What about the class of students
who arguably need extra protection beyond that of their peers?
Additionally, what about the class of students who just cannot
seem to control their impulses and have a higher propensity for
inappropriate peer relations due to their disability? Compared
to their peers, students with disabilities run a higher risk of
being either the target or the perpetrator of peer sexual
harassment. 9 This propensity may be attributed to their
"difficulties [in] using appropriate social skills and their lack of
insight regarding how their behavior affects interpersonal
relationships." 10
This article will outline the challenges that schools, and
their officials, face in providing a safe environment for all
students, and specifically for students with disabilities. This

5.

KEHN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMEIUCAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW

301 (6th ed. 2005).
6. !d. at :-l01.
7. !d. at 501.
8. Davis v. Monroe, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
9. Ellie L. Young et a!., Sexual Harassment among Students with Educational
Disabilities: Perspectives of Special Educators, 29 REM";DJAL & SPECIAL Enuc. 208, 208
(Aug. 2008) (citing A.K. Kavale & S. Forness, Social Shills Deficits and Learnin~t
Disabilities: A Meta-Analysis, 29 ,J. LEARNING DISABILI'I'IES 226--il7 (1996)).
10. /d. at 208 (citing K. L. LAm; ET AL., [NTEIWENTIONS FOR CHILDllEN WITH OR AT
RISK FOR EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL D!SOIWERS 212-58 (2002)).
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article will begin by outlining the most recent circuit court
decision that follows the Davis v. Monroe framework, Patterson
v. Hudson Area Schools, and will demonstrate how the Sixth
Circuit has chosen to apply Davis to this area of the law. Then
the article will address, in turn, the implications of special
education students as targets of peer sexual harassment,
special education students as perpetrators of peer sexual
harassment, and situations identifying both the target and the
perpetrator as students with disabilities. Furthermore, this
article seeks to identify when the school will be held liable in
cases of student-on-student sexual harassment, and where
various courts have drawn the line with respect to the
"deliberate indifference" standard for school liability. Lastly the
article will address where the Davis standard lies today with
regards to same-sex student-on-student sexual harassment.
II.

THE STORY OF A BOY NAMED DP

Everyone knows that the middle and high school years can
be rough; adolescence is not a walk in the park. But for a boy
named DP, those years were perhaps the worst of his life. It all
began in 2002 when DP was a sixth-grade student attending
Hudson Area Schools (hereinafter "Hudson"). It started with
peers of DP calling him names, and pushing and shoving him
in the hallways. The name-calling was mostly sexual in nature,
with labels such as "queer" and "faggot" used on almost a daily
basis. When DP reported some of these instances, he was told
"kids will be kids, it's middle school." 11 As a result of this
harassment, DP became anxious, distraught and angry, and
started receiving psychological treatment. 12 In seventh grade
the harassment of DP only escalated: along with "queer" and
"faggot," other words such as "man boobs" and "gay" were used
on a daily basis, more than 200 times during this school year. 13
Additionally, the term "Mr. Clean" was used by his peers to
reference DP's supposed lack of pubic hair. 14 Naturally, DP
wanted to quit school not far into his seventh grade year. At
this point, the school principal offered to mentor DP; however,

11.
12.
1:3.
14.

Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.3d 138, 439 (6th Cir. 2009).
!d. at 1<10.
!d.
!d.
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these visits were short-lived as they coincided with the visits of
problem students at the end of each day and DP feared he
would be labeled a "trouble kid" by his peers. 15 DP continued to
withdraw socially, eating lunch by himself in the band room to
avoid his peers. 16
DP's parents (hereinafter "the Pattersons") repeatedly
reported these incidences, as well as their concerns, to school
administrators, counselors, and teachers at various conferences
starting in the sixth grade. 17 In December of DP's seventh
grade year, the Pattersons met with the principal and
discussed DP's suffering grades, as well as DP's desire to not
return to school. 18 As the year went on, the Pattersons
continued to meet with school administration where school
staff repeatedly told the Pattersons that DP was doing nothing
wrong to merit this type of harassment from his peers. 19
After seventh grade, the school counselor had DP evaluated
for special education services, which established that DP was
emotionally impaired, qualifying him for services under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (hereinafter
"IDEA"). 20 As such, during his eighth grade year, DP was
assigned to receive help from a resource teacher for one period
each day. 21 The resource teacher was especially effective in
teaching DP to cope with his peers and as a result, DP had a
successful eighth grade year. 22 However, because the resource
teacher was specifically for middle school students, when DP
began high school the following year, he was no longer able to
receive mentorship from the resource teacher. 23 Although the
middle school resource room was housed in the same building
as the high school, the principal denied specific requests by the
Pattersons for DP to continue meeting with the resource
teacher, and DP did not receive any new or additional resource
room support during his ninth grade year. 24

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

I d.
!d.
I d.
ld. at 141.
!d.
20 u.s.c. §§ 1400-1150 (2005).
Patterson, 551 F.ild at 111.
I d.
/d.
!d.
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Ninth grade brought back all of the same problems that DP
experienced during his sixth and seventh grade years,
including pushing, shoving and name-calling with words such
as "faggot," "queer," and again, "Mr. Clean." 25 After reporting
those incidences, those particular name-calling students did
not bother DP again; however, other students found new ways
to harass DP. A fellow student wrote "[DP] is a fag" on the back
of DP's presentations note cards so that the entire class could
read it. 26 Another student defaced DP's planner with phrases
such as "I like it in the Ass," "I [heart] penis," "I'm a mamma's
boy/1 suck on her nipple" and drawings of buttocks and a
penis. 27 Additionally, students hung a "Mr. Clean" poster on
DP's locker.n All students involved in these incidences received
only a verbal reprimand by either the school counselor or
principal, with the exception of one student who was suspended
for one day, as he had previously violated an unrelated school
rule. 29 All students involved never bothered DP again to the
knowledge of school administration. 30
However, there continued to be incidences of harassment
where the school could not identify the student perpetrator. A
student broke into DP's gym locker, threw his shoes in the
toilet, urinated on his clothes, and used shaving cream to spell
out sexually oriented words on the locker. 31 A few months later,
unknown students vandalized DP's locker on both the inside
and outside with words such as "faggot," "gay," "queer," "suck
your mother's tits," and "you suck clicks," illustrated by
pictures of a penis being inserted into a rectum. 32 Although
Hudson reports conducting an investigation, it never identified
or held any student responsible for these acts. 33
In May of his ninth grade year, DP was the victim of sexual
assault when a fellow teammate took off his clothes and
cornered DP in the locker room after baseball practice. 34 This

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

::Jo.
;:)1.

:12.
:3:1.

:H.

!d. at 4-12.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
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teammate rubbed his genitals on DP's neck and face while
another teammate blocked the exit to the locker room,
preventing DP's escape. 35 The Pattersons informed the
principal of this incident the next day during a double-header
baseball game, in which both DP and the perpetrator were
participating. 36 The following Monday Hudson began
investigating the incident, and the student perpetrator was
suspended for the eight remaining days of the school year. 37 A
few weeks later this student perpetrator was charged with
assault with the intent to commit a felony and criminal sexual
conduct in the second degree. 38 Eventually this student was
expelled from Hudson after pleading guilty to disorderly
conduct. 39 The second student, who blocked the exit during the
incident, received only a verbal reprimand. 40
The outrageous nature of this incident did not stop with the
actions of the student athlete. Although Hudson took action by
suspending the student perpetrator, the school still allowed
this student to participate in the end-of-year sports banquet,
held one week after the incident. 41 Even more alarming were
the actions of the baseball team coach who, after hearing word
of the incident, held a baseball team meeting where he told his
players, in the presence of DP, to "not joke around with guys
who can't take a man joke."42 As a result of all this harassment,
DP was psychologically unable to return to the Hudson
campus, and so for his tenth grade year DP received
instructional services from Hudson via the campus of a nearby
Catholic elementary school. 43 Although teachers visited DP
occasionally, they were largely unavailable and as a result, DP
was not academically successful that year. 44 Eventually DP
was able to take classes at the local college, facilitating his
early graduation. 45

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
11.
42.
43.
41.
45.

!d.
!d.
!d. at 413.
!d.
!d.
!d.
I d.
!d.
!d.
I d.
!d.
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After years of harassment by his peers, DP's parents filed
suit under Title IX, claiming that Hudson Area Schools
violated Title IX by allowing their son to be harassed. After the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
district, the Pattersons appealed. 46 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals found there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the school district was deliberately indifferent to
student-on-student sexual harassment, and so the case was
reversed and remanded. The Hudson Area School District
petitioned for a rehearing as well as a rehearing en bane, but
both were denied on May 1, 2009. 47 Certiorari was also denied
by the Supreme Court of the United States in October 2009.

III. ONE MORE LOOK AT THE FACTS
If the facts are taken as true, DP had any number of
horrific experiences created by his ruthless and unfeeling
peers. But were the school staff and administration ruthless
and unfeeling as well? Is it fair to say the school should be held
accountable for failing to prevent every incident of student-onstudent peer harassment? One more look at the facts
surrounding this case may reveal a different side.
The busy principal was encumbered by delinquent students
and endless discipline tasks inherent to a public middle school,
yet he volunteered to take time each day to mentor DP. Should
the principal be labeled as "indifferent" when he was absent
from his office on some of the days DP came to meet with him?
Was he "deliberate" when he asked to see DP at the end of the
day when he also happened to check in with problem
students?48 It was DP's choice to stop meeting with the
principal, not the unavailability of the principal, which ended
these mentoring sessions. 49
Not all the incidents involving DP were reported, but each
time an incident was reported, the school took action when an
individual offender could be identified. Although many times
the offending student received only a verbal reprimand, this
form of disciplinary action was effective in the sense that there

46.
17.
18.
49.

/d. at 1:l8.
!d.
!d. at 110.
/d. at 15:l (Vinson, .J., dissenting).

708

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

were never repeat offenders. 50 In the case of other reported
incidences, DP could not furnish a name of the offending
student, nor could the school discover who it was, despite their
investigations. To what lengths should a school go in order to
discipline one student and to deter all other students from
engaging in the same misconduct?
In an effort to educate students about peer harassment and
bullying, Hudson implemented programs such as "Bang, Bang,
You're Dead" and "Flirting and Hurting." 51 The Pattersons
brought evidence that these types of programs were not
effective, nor were they always taught to every single student.
The dissenting opinion, however, points out that the school did
have policies and procedures for harassment in place, and the
failure to make every single student understand their
significance was more of a negligence argument rather than
deliberate indifference on the part of the school. 5 2
The school counselor regularly invited DP to attend both
individual and group counseling sessions for students
experiencing peer relationship struggles. DP also received
preferential classroom seating, extra time to take tests, and
counseling sessions with a social worker. 53 Over the summer,
when most school staff was on vacation, the school psychologist
and social worker evaluated DP and assisted him in qualifying
for special services, including an Individualized Education Plan
(hereinafter "IEP"). 54 This allowed DP to become eligible for
supporting services, including access to a resource teacher. 55
The resource teacher who acted as a mentor for DP during
his eighth grade year was actually the science teacher, and the
resource room was nothing more than a study hall for DP. 56 It
was not the access to a resource room or program, but rather it
was the mentor relationship of the science teacher that allowed

50. ld. at 442 (majority opinion) (stating an account of all incidences of
harassment experienced by DP where when offending student was identified and
disciplined, the record states that so and so "never bothered Dl' again").
51. ld. at 450 n.lO.
52. Id. at 454-55 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 453.
54. ld. at 441 (majority opinion).
55. Jd.
56. Jd. at 454 n.6 (Vinson, J., dissenting) (DP himself testified that the "resource
room" was actually a study hall, where he would do his homework. When qtwstioned
about what actually caused the positive turnaround during his eighth grade year, DP
said "I have no clue.").
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DP to have a successful school year. When DP matriculated to
ninth grade, this science teacher generously offered to continue
to mentor DP for 25 to 30 minutes each week and the principal
consented to this opportunity. 57 Should the high school be held
liable for not providing DP with another study hall and adult
mentor?
The locker room incident from DP's ninth grade year
resulted in the permanent expulsion of the offender from
Hudson schools and criminal prosecution. Mter his tenth grade
year, DP had the opportunity to take college courses, paid for
entirely by Hudson, allowing him to take advanced classes,
become fluent in Japanese, and graduate from high school
early with As and Bs. 58 Although his education took on a
nontraditional form, DP was not denied access to educational
opportunities despite the harassment by other students.
Instead, the school provided a creative solution that allowed
DP to successfully finish high school.
IV. TITLE IX: THE PATTERSONS' CLAIM AGAINST HUDSON AREA
SCHOOLS
The Pattersons' complaint against Hudson alleged that
Hudson violated DP's equal protection rights as well as Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972. 59 Additionally, the
Pattersons filed suit against the superintendent of Hudson,
claiming that she failed to properly train staff regarding
harassment issues and ensure compliance with federal law and
Hudson policies. 60 In analyzing the Title IX claim, the district
court relied on the three-part test from Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, and granted summary judgment in favor
of Hudson. The court determined specifically that the third
prong "deliberate indifference" standard of the Davis three-part
test was unmet, as the Pattersons' failed to show how Hudson's
response was "clearly unreasonable in light of known
circumstances." 61 As for the other two prongs of the Davis test,

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
(1999)).

ld. at 151.
I d. at 15il.
Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005).
Patterson, 551 F.ild at 11:3 (majority opinion).
/d. at 411 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Ed. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648
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it is undisputed that the Pattersons met the burdens for those
requirements. 62
On appeal, the Pattersons' only claim was that the district
court erred in determining that, as a matter of law, Hudson
was not deliberately indifferent and thereby did not violate
Title IX. As such, the Sixth Circuit Court focused entirely on
the Title IX claim against Hudson, and did not consider the
alleged violation of equal protection, or the case against
Hudson's superintendent as Title IX holds no individual
liability claim. 63 The Sixth Circuit undertook a de novo review,
analyzing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Pattersons. 64 Mter a thorough analysis of
the facts of the case, the Sixth Circuit majority concluded that
the Pattersons did indeed demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether Hudson's actions were
deliberately indifferent and the case was reversed and
remanded. 65 To reach this decision, the court relied heavily on
its own reasoning from a prior Title IX Sixth Circuit case,
Vance v. Spencer County Public School District. 66 The Vance
court, in turn, relied on the Supreme Court decision in Davis to
arrive at its conclusion that a school board was deliberately
indifferent to the sexual harassment of a female high school
student by other students and therefore liable under Title IX. 67

V.

THE DAVIS THREE-PART TEST FOR DETERMINING TITLE IX
LIABILITY

In 1999, the Supreme Court ruled in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education that Title IX may support a private
cause of action against a recipient of federal funds where there
exists a claim for student-on-student sexual harassment. 68 In
order to establish the prima facie case for this claim, the

62. !d. at 150 (where the other two prongs of the Davis Test require the plaintiff
to establish that (1) the sexual harassment was so severe that it could he said to
deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities, and (2) the funding
recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment).
63. Id. at 414.
64. Id. at 441 (relying on Nat'] Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 111 F.:ld 561, 56:i (6th Cir.
1991) for the standard of review).
65. /d. at 446.
66. Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 2:31 F.:ld 25:l (6th Cir. 2000).
67. Id.
68. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 6:l:l (1999).
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plaintiff must establish that (1) the sexual harassment was so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could be said
to deprive the plaintiff of access to the educational
opportunities or benefits provided by the school, (2) the funding
recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, and
(3) the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the
harassment. 69 Eleven years later, the Davis decision still
stands as the prcccdcntial case defining student-on-student
sexual harassment in the school environment.
The Davis decision came about from a situation where a
fifth-grade girl had been the victim of sexual harassment by
another student who made vulgar comments such as "I want to
get in bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs," as well as
attempts to touch the girl's breasts and genital area. 70
Although the victim reported each incident to her teacher and
her mother, and the teacher assured the mother that the
principal was aware, this harassment continued for several
months and the offender went undisciplined. 71 It was also
reported that a number of other girls in the same fifth-grade
class tried to report similar complaints to the principal, but the
teacher denied their request, stating, "If [the principal] wants
you, he'll call you.'m For five months this behavior continued
until finally the offending student pled guilty to sexual
misconduct. The damage to the victim, however, had already
been done, as her previously high grades dropped, her level of
distractedness in school rose, and her father even found a
suicide note that she wrote. 73 The court concluded that the
school district's lack of response suggested "deliberate
indifference" where (1) the principal failed to discipline the
student beyond stating "I guess I'll have to threaten him a little
bit harder," (2) the teacher made no effort to separate the
plaintiff from the student when their classroom seats were
adjacent, and (3) the Monroe County Board of Education had
yet to instruct its personnel on how to respond to peer sexual
harassment, nor had it developed policy on the matter. 74

69.
70.
71.
72.
7:3.
74.

Id.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.

at 629, 633.
at 6:l3.
at 634.
at 6:35.
at 6:H.
at 634-:l5.
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As student-on-student harassment under Title IX had not
been addressed previously, the Davis court borrowed heavily
from language found in Title VII to conclude that:
[A]s Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a
sexually hostile environment created by co-workers and
tolerated by the employer, Title IX encompasses a claim for
damages due to a sexually hostile educational environment
created by a fellow student or students when the supervising
authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the
harassment. 75

The Davis Court also looked to a handbook issued by the
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights for guidance
on what a school district's appropriate response should be for
student-on-student harassment. 76 The handbook stressed that
a school should "take immediate and appropriate steps to
investigate or otherwise determine what occurred and take
steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a
hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent
harassment from occurring again." 77
The final standard on deliberate indifference to come out of
Davis is still used by courts today, and holds that a federal
funds recipient (public school) is deliberately indifferent where
"recipient's response to the harassment or lack thereof is
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances."n
This does not mean a school must "'remedy' peer harassment,
and [] 'ensur[e] that ... students conform their conduct to'
certain rules. Title IX imposes no such requirements. On the
contrary, the recipient must merely respond to known peer
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable." 79
The phrase "not clearly unreasonable" is the prong where
circuit courts, as well as district courts, have split. Exactly
what type of conduct ensures that a school district's response to
student-on-student harassment is "not clearly unreasonable" is
still up for debate. However, the Davis majority opinion was
clear to stress that avoiding liability is not accomplished "only

75. ld. at 636.
76. Davis at 526 U.S. at 618 (citing Dep't of Educ., Office for Civ. Rts .• Sexual
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students,
or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12031, 12039-12010 (Mar. 1:J, 1997)).
77. Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.:ld 253, 261 n.5 (6th Cir. 2000).
78. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-19 (citations omitted).
79. ld. at 648-49.
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by purging their schools of actionable peer harassment." Nor
does it mean that "administrators must engage in particular
disciplinary action," where victims of peer harassment would
make "particular remedial demands." 80 In fact, the majority
opinion went on to articulate that "courts should refrain from
second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school
administrators." 81
VI.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT STRETCHING VANCE TOO FAR: HOW
PATTERSON RATCHETS UP THE LEVEL OF SCHOOL
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF PREVENTING ALL
FUTURE PEER HARASSMENT

Vance, like Davis, involved a case of student-on-student
harassment where the parents claimed, and the Sixth Circuit
Court agreed, that the school acted deliberately indifferent. 82
In Vance, a high school female was repeatedly harassed by the
same male classmates, including lewd name-calling, shoving,
and propositioning, culminating in an episode of sexual assault
in the classroom where two boys held her down, pulled her
hair, and tried to take off her shirt while another boy took off
his pants. 83 Although the female student's mother wrote a
letter to the principal detailing this incident, the boys were
never disciplined, nor were law enforcement officials involved.
The court found the school deliberately indifferent. 84
The defendant school in Vance tried to argue that the Davis
standard meant that as long as the school did something in
response to harassment complaint, it had satisfied the Davis
standard and was not deliberately indifferent. The court in
Vance did not accept this argument. Rather, the court in Vance
responded with this statement:
Such minimalist response is not within the contemplation of a
reasonable response. Although no particular response is
required, and although the school district is not required to
eradicate all sexual harassment, the school district must
respond and must do so reasonably in light of the known
circumstances. Thus, where a school district has knowledge

80. !d. at 618.
81. !d. (citing T.L.O. v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. :325, 342 n.9 (1985)).
82. Vance, 2:11 F.ild at 25:3.
8:~. !d. at 256.
81. !d.
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that its remedial action is inadequate and ineffective, it is
required to take reasonable action in light of those
circumstances to eliminate the behavior. Where a school
district has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are
ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no
avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the
known circumstances. 85

In Patterson, the Sixth Circuit majority viewed the prior
Vance fact pattern as analogous to the case at hand: both cases
involved a student being harassed by peers over an extended
period of time. Both cases involved an escalating event of
sexual assault by other students. In both cases the Sixth
Circuit determined that Davis's third prong of "deliberate
indifference" was met where the school's lack of response to the
harassment was "clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances." 86
However, what the Patterson court fails to take into account
are the significant differences between the facts of the
Patterson case and the facts of the Vance case. In Vance,
whenever the female student would complain of being
harassed, the administration either did nothing, or only
verbally reprimanded the offending classmates, which led to an
escalation of the harassment. The disciplinary action was not
effective, and the same classmates were repeat offenders. In
Patterson, each time the administration gave a verbal
reprimand to a harassing student, that student never bothered
DP again. In Vance, when the female student was sexually
assaulted by the group of males, the school did not take any
disciplinary action, did not launch an investigation, did not
involve law enforcement officials, and did not offer the female
student a change of classroom, even when the mother filed a
report with the district's Title IX coordinator. 87 In Patterson,
when the locker room sexual assault incident occurred, the
school launched an investigation, expelled the offender
permanently, and involved the law enforcement who charged
the offender criminally. 88
How much should the courts require the schools to do
before they are outside the zone of "deliberate indifference"?
85.
86.
87.
88.

/d. at 260-61.
ld. at 260.
ld. at 253.
Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.:id <1:38, 11il (2009).

2]

HELPING STUDENTS

715

The Vance court clearly articulates that "[t]he recipient is not
required to 'remedy' sexual harassment nor ensure that
students conform their conduct to certain rules, but rather, 'the
recipient must merely respond to known peer harassment in a
manner that is not clearly unreasonable."' 89 The court goes on
to articulate that a victim in these circumstances does not have
"a right to particular remedial demands" and that "courts
should not second guess the disciplinary decisions that school
administrators make." 90
If the Patterson decision stands, the courts might ratchet up
the level of school vigilance and responsiveness so high, that
schools will be asked to do the impossible task of remedying all
future harassment, as well as purging schools of all current
peer harassment. The court in Vance was correct to
acknowledge that if a school just does something, they still
might not be entirely off the hook. However, the Patterson
court has taken this one step too far by second-guessing the
school authorities' responses to dealing with student-onstudent harassment.

VII. THE DAVIS STANDARD APPLIED TO THE SPECIAL
EDUCATION SECTOR

Although none of the players in the Davis case were special
education students, many of the cases that follow Davis involve
special education students, and in particular, mentally or
physically disabled students. The world of special education
adds a whole new set of rules, statutes, due process
considerations, and policies that further complicate incidents of
student-on-student sexual harassment. When peer harassment
occurs, the Davis standard calls for actions by schools that are
"not clearly unreasonable" in light of the known
circumstances. 91 But it remains unclear what qualifies as
sufficient intervention when the students themselves are
physically, emotionally, or mentally disabled.

89. Vance, 2:31 F.:ld at 260 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 618-49).
90. Patterson, 551 F.3d at 116 (citing Vance, 231 F.3d at 260).
91. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).
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Special Education Students as Targets of Peer Harassment

In Patterson, the boy DP was classified as a special
education student and given an IEP allowing him to access a
resource room during his eighth grade year, which proved to be
successful in combating the peer harassment. However, in
ninth grade his IEP was modified and the principal "didn't
think that [the high school resource room] was the place for
[DP]." 92 This was one of several factors considered by the Sixth
Circuit in determining there was a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether Hudson's actions were deliberately
indifferent. 93
In another Sixth Circuit case, Soper v. Hoben, a parent filed
a Title IX suit against a school district when her special
education daughter, Renee, was raped by one of her
classmates. However, the court dismissed the claim against the
school district, finding the last two prongs of the Davis Test
were unmet. 94 Renee was a middle school student who had
Down's Syndrome and was classified as an "educable mentally
impaired" student (EMI). She was placed in a class with
several other EMI students, including "Boy A," the boy who
raped her. Prior to enrolling in this class, Renee's mother had
informed the school and teacher of a prior kissing incident
between Renee and Boy A, and the teacher reassured the
mother that they would "keep an eye on the children," stating
"[t]hey're well supervised." 95 However, shortly into the school
year, Renee was raped by Boy A after he told her to hide in the
back room when the teacher was locking up. 96 Additionally,
Renee was molested by two other male classmates. 97
Upon hearing about the rape and molestation incidences,
the school immediately launched an investigation, contacted
Child Protective Services, and implemented a plan for
increased supervision of Renee while in school. 9 ~ Additionally
the school installed windows in the special education classroom
doors, placed aides in the class and on the school bus, and

92.
9:3.
91.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Patterson, 551 F.:3d at 411.
ld. at 416.
Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.:id 815 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 849.
ld.
Id.
ld.
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referred all three boys to counseling sessions. 99 However, Boy A
was not suspended until months later, when he was formally
charged by law enforcement, and the two boys involved in the
molestation incident were never disciplined by the school. 100
Despite the dissatisfaction of Renee's mother with the school's
response, the Sixth Circuit found that the "prompt and
thorough response by school officials" was not "clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." 101 The
court contrasted the quick actions of school officials in this case
with Davis where the school failed to respond to complaints of
peer sexual harassment for over five months. 102
Alternatively, the dissenting opinion for Soper points out
that the school did in fact have notice of a prior incident of
harassment involving Renee and Boy A when Renee's mother
reported the prior kissing incident and specifically requested
that Renee and Boy A not be left alone together. 103 However,
the school did not honor this request and although "assurances
were given, no steps were actually taken to minimize or stop
the harassment." 104 Rather, on the day of the rape, Boy A was
allowed to accompany Renee alone to her locker. 105 Instead of
incorporating the prior harassment incident into the
"deliberate indifference" analysis, the court simply treated the
rape incident as the first sign of "notice" and used that as the
starting point to assess how quickly and effectively the school
prevented a future recurrence of rape. However, if the court
had expanded its analysis to include this prior incident, then
"arguably,
these
actions
amounted
to
deliberate
106
indifference."
What is interesting is how the Sixth Circuit distinguished
this case from Vance, where the court stated: "Because of
Spencer's deliberate indifference, it is readily distinguishable
from Soper v. Hoben." 107 Soper was decided first, in 1999, just a
few months after the Davis decision, and Vance was decided

99.
100.
101.
102.
10:1.
101.
105.
106.
107.

Jd.
/d.
!d.
/d.
Jd.
Jd.

at 850.
at 850.
at 855.
(citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)).
at 857 (Moore, J., dissenting).

/d. at 819 (majority opinion).
/d. at 857 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Vancl' v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 2:31 F.3d 25:3, 262 (6th Cir. 2000).
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one year later in November of 2000. The Sixth Circuit then
looked back to Vance, not to Soper, in making its 2009 decision
for Patterson v. Hudson Schools.
Outside the Sixth Circuit, other courts are struggling with
the same balancing act. Part of the debate within this Davis
"deliberate indifference" standard lies in whether or not a
school district is required to treat the continued harassment of
one student as a systemic issue. If the standard calls for a
systemic approach, then a school must effectively prevent the
future harassment by any student perpetrator against the
victim. The other view would be to hold a school district
accountable only for the failure to stop continued harassment
by a known perpetrator.
In Doe v. Bellefonte Area School District, the Third Circuit
held that the school district was not deliberately indifferent to
known circumstances of student-on-student harassment where
a student was harassed for three years by his peers for his
"effeminate" characteristics. 108 Although this case does not
involve a student with disabilities, it further clarifies that
schools need not completely eradicate peer harassment before
escaping liability, but instead must act in a "clearly
reasonable" manner. The student's parents filed suit against
the school district under Title IX, believing that the school was
"deliberately indifferent" because their "method of dealing with
specific, identified perpetrators was not 100% effective in
stemming the harassment." 109 The parents suggested that the
school should have treated the ongoing harassment as a
"systemic problem." The court, however, relied on language
from Davis to make its decision and recognized that the school
was quick to respond with "reasonable actions which
eliminated further harassment between Doe and the student(s)
involved in each incident." 110 The school took further steps to
respond by warning, counseling, and even suspending the
offending students, holding assemblies to educate the student
body, and circulating memoranda to faculty and staff putting
them on notice of the reported harassment of Doe. 111 The court
held that the school district was not deliberately indifferent
108. Doe v. Bellafonte Area Sch. Dist., No. 03-1210, 106 Fed. App'x. 798 Uld Cir.
Aug. 1, 2004).
109. ld. at 799.
110. ld. at 800.
111. ld.
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despite the fact that it "did not undertake the specific remedial
action that Doe desired," but rather, insisted that the court
"refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary actions made by
the School District which effectively eliminated each reported
source of harassment." 112
A similar case to Soper v. Hoben from the Sixth Circuit, but
with a different outcome, was brought to the Tenth Circuit in
Murrell u. School District No. 1, where the court found that the
school district was liable under a Title IX claim. In this case
the school principal and teachers had knowledge of the sexual
harassment and assault of a student, who was a
developmentally and physically disabled student, but chose to
turn a blind eye. 113
Penelope Jones was both physically disabled, due to
cerebral palsy and deafness in one ear, and also
developmentally disabled, functioning intellectually at the level
of a first-grader, although she was a high school student. 114
When she enrolled in high school, her mother informed her
teachers as well as school administrators that Penelope had
been sexually assaulted at her previous school and "expressed
her fear that her daughter's mental and physical disabilities
would place her at continued risk." 115 The school assured
Penelope's mother that she would be "properly supervised," 116
but did not inform her mother of several instances where a
developmentally delayed male student harassed and sexually
assaulted Penelope. It was not until Penelope starting
engaging in suicidal behavior and entered a psychiatric
hospital that her mother was informed of the sexual assault
incidents. 117 Additionally, the school failed to notify the
appropriate law enforcement officials, did not discipline the
male student who perpetrated the assaults, and instead
suspended Penelope and suggested the sexual contact was
consensual, even though the school knew Penelope was legally
incapable of consenting. 11 8

112.
llil.
111.
115.
116.
117.
118.

!d.
Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 186 F.3d 12::38 (lOth Cir. 1999).
!d. at 1213.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 1211.
!d.
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As this case occurred in the same timeframe as the Davis
case, the Tenth Circuit waited for the Supreme Court's ruling
in Davis before making its own decision. 119 In relying on Davis,
the Tenth Circuit reasoned in Murrell that where school
officials had actual knowledge of repeated sexual assault by a
student and yet decided to remain idle, this was deliberate
indifference. 12 Furthermore, this "deliberate indifference to
her claims totally deprived [Penelope] of [her] educational
benefits." 121 In this case, all prongs of the Davis Test were met,
and the school was held liable.
However, the Murrell court felt that the Davis decision "did
not expressly set out the standard for determining when a
school board has sufficient notice that harassment is taking
place." 122 So, the Tenth Circuit looked to a Seventh Circuit
Title IX decision, Doe v. University of Illinois, which held that a
school district is liable if "a school official who had actual
knowledge of the abuse was invested by the school board with
the duty to supervise the [harasser] and the power to take
action that would end such abuse and failed to do so." 123 The
Murrell court went on to explain that in addition to actual
knowledge of the harassment, a school official must also
possess the "requisite control over the situation" in order to
invoke Title IX liability through the Davis standard. 124 The
court, in addressing this "requisite control" standard and in
acknowledging the fine line of Title IX claims, discussed the
impossibility of circumscribing all possible fact scenarios into
one cut and dry "actual knowledge accompanied by deliberate
indifference" standard:

°

We decline simply to name job titles that would or would not
adequately satisfy this requirement. "[S]chool districts
contain a number of layers below the school board:
superintendents, principals, vice-principals, and teachers and
coaches, not to mention specialized counselors such as Title
IX coordinators. Different school districts may assign
different duties to these positions or even reject the
traditional hierarchical structure altogether." Rosa H., 106

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

!d. at 1215.
Jd. at 1217.
!d. at 1249.
!d. at 1247.
Jd. (citing Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 1:-38 F.::ld 65:!, 668 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Td. at 1216.
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F.3d at 660. Because officials' roles vary among school
districts, deciding who exercises substantial control for the
purposes of Title IX liability is necessarily a fact-based
inquiry. Davis makes clear, however, that a school official
who has the authority to halt known abuse, perhaps by
measures such as transferring the harassing student to a
different class, suspending him, curtailing his privileges, or
providing additional
supervisiOn,
would
meet this
definition. 125

The court reasoned that a school district is liable where it
"has made a conscious decision to permit sex discrimination in
its programs, and precludes liability where the school district
could not have remedied the harassment because it had no
knowledge thereof or had no authority to respond to the
harassment." 126 This limits liability to "circumstances wherein
the recipient exercises substantial control over both the
harasser and the context in which the known harassment
occurs." 127 The Murrell court went on to quote from Davis,
stating that the school principal's "response to the harassment
or lack thereof [was] clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances." 128

B.

Special Education Students as Perpetrators of Peer Sexual
Harassment

Special education students as targets of peer sexual
harassment is only one side of the coin. Special Education
students are sometimes the perpetrators as well. In a 2008
survey of Utah special education teachers, 92% reported
observations of peer sexual harassment incidents involving
students with disabilities, with an 88% observation rate of
situations where the disabled students was the perpetrator,
and an 84% observation rate of those students as the target. 129
With so many special education students prone to be the
perpetrator, and not just the target, school administrators and
teachers should take care not to lightly dismiss these types of

125. !d. at 1217 (citing Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 618, 660
(5th Cir. 1997)).
126. !d. at 1216.
127. !d. (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999)).
128. !d. at 1218 (citing Davis 526 U.S. at 618).
129. Young, supra note 9, at 213-21 (where 250 Utah special education teachers
were surveyed, with 129 responding to the survey).
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harassment incidents without further investigation. Take, for
the example, the case of Jones v. Indiana Area School District
in 2005, where school officials with sufficient control had actual
knowledge of ongoing harassment by a special education
student against another student. 130
As a student in the Indiana Area School District, Rachel
Jones was assigned alphabetically to the same home room as
special education student John Doe, a mentally retarded
student who suffered from Sturge-Weber Syndrome. 131 Rachel's
mother, Nancy Jones, was employed as a vision specialist in
her daughter's school district by an agency that contracted with
several school districts within the area to provide educational
services. 132 At first Doe harassed Rachel by sending her notes
and drawings expressing his desire to be her girlfriend. 133
Rachel reported this behavior to her homeroom teacher in the
eighth and ninth grades, and Rachel's mother also reported
this behavior to Rachel's guidance counselor. 134 At this time
Doe had an IEP with a behavior plan, but no services were
provided to help him with deal with this type of harassing
behavior, and no mention was made of Rachel's reports in his
behavior plan. 135 In tenth grade Doe's harassing behavior
increased and Rachel's mother had continuous and ongoing
conversations with Doe's special education teacher about this
unwanted affection and attention towards Rachel. 136 In
eleventh grade Doe began to stalk Rachel, waiting for her at
her locker, walking her to class, waiting for her at her car after
school, etc. 137 Rachel enlisted the help of her biology teacher,
who made efforts to keep an eye on Rachel in the hallways for
the next two years, and who also passed along these concerns
to the administration. 138
In the spring of her eleventh grade year, Rachel and her
mother met with the vice principal of the school to discuss
further concerns about Doe stalking Rachel, and about rumors

130.
131.
132.
1:33.
131.
135.
136.
137.
1:38.

Jones v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628 (W.D. Penn. 2005).
Jd. at 634.

Id.
I d.
Id.
ld.
ld.
ld.
I d.
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of Doe and his friends wanting to beat up Rachel. 139 The vice
principal told Doe that he could not be friends with Rachel
anymore, thinking this would alleviate the problem, but
subsequent reports proved otherwise and the vice principal
even went so far as to hold a meeting with Doe's parents that
spring. 140 Also that spring, in an IEP conference for Doe, IEP
team members reported "no" when asked if Doe exhibits
"behaviors that impede his leHrning or that of others." 141 In the
fall of Rachel's senior year, Doe continued to stalk her and even
tried to force himself into her car located on school grounds in
the parking lot. 142 The vice principal continued to assure
Rachel and her mother that they would talk to Doe, but his
behavior did not change. A few months later Doe physically
blocked Rachel in the weight room for half an hour. 143 At this
point, Rachel's mother involved the State Police, who advised
the school that Rachel should have someone with her at all
times. 144 The school eventually provided a female aid to "tail"
Doe around the school, even though Doe's mother stated that a
male aid was needed. 145 The school also arranged for Doe to be
transported directly from his work assignment to his home and
the district advised its teachers and coaches that Doe should
not have any contact with Rachel. 146 The district also modified
Doe's IEP behavior plan to specifically include his problem with
Rachel for the first time since his harassment of Rachel began,
five years earlier. 14 7
Rachel's mother made repeated attempts to engage school
officials in stopping Doe's harassment, including addressing
the school board, and sending a complaint to the Pennsylvania
Department of Education. 14 ll The school board did instruct a
district employee to look into the possibility of transferring Doe
to a neighboring district, but the request was denied when that
employee told the neighboring district about Doe's harassment

!d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
1~:3. !d.
1~~- /d.
115. ld.
146. /d.
117. /d.
1~8. ld.

1:19.
110.
111.
142.

at 6:~5-a6.
at 636.

at 6:l7.

at 6c18.
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problems. 149 The district also offered Rachel the option of
switching to homebound instruction, which she did not accept,
as her current involvement in AP classes helped her candidacy
for college entrance. 150 After Rachel's mother Nancy became so
involved in advocating for Rachel, the superintendent sent a
request to Nancy's boss asking her to be transferred to another
district to which Nancy responded with a grievance claiming
the transfer was discriminatory and lacked just cause, but her
grievance was eventually denied by a collective bargaining
agreement arbitrator. 151
Rachel and her mother subsequently filed suit in district
court alleging, among other claims, that the school district
violated Rachel's Title IX rights. 152 While the other counts were
dismissed, the court found that there was a genuine issue as to
material facts in determining if the school district was
"deliberately indifferent" under the Davis standard. 153
At first glance, a school official might have dismissed Doe's
behavior as harmless, because "he didn't know any better."
However, it was enough for the court to find that his behavior
had the potential to substantively interfere with another
student's educational opportunities. It could be that Doe is like
many other students with disabilities, who have "difficulty
understanding how others perceive their behavior and may
lack the awareness to detect obvious social cues." 154 Students
in these types of situations are often disregarded as a threat of
liability for the school as "sexual harassment remains an
almost invisible issue for special education." 155 Regardless of
the reason or motive for the harassment, responses by school
officials to peer sexual harassment "require sensitivity to both
the target and the perpetrator" as "[a]ll students have a right
to attend school without fear of harassment." 156

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Jd. at 638-39.

!d. at 639.
Jd. at 641.
Jd.

Id. at 612.
Young, supra note 9, at 210.
Jd. at 210.
!d. at 219.
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Peer Harassment Where Both Parties are Disabled
Students

Whether or not a school district exercised "deliberate
indifference" in the face of student-on-student sexual
harassment can sometimes be a very close call, especially
where both students are developmentally delayed. In Counts v.
Clackamas, a developmentally delayed female student was
allegedly raped by her classmate, another developmentally
delayed male student, and her parents filed a Title IX suit
against the school district. 157 The parents contend that the
school district failed to take adequate measures in preventing a
subsequent sexual assault after a prior incidence occurred with
this same male student assaulting another female student the
previous year. 158 The district court ultimately found that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
district was deliberately indifferent to the rights of a disabled
student. 159
In Counts, all three students were classmates in a "life
skills" class for special education students when the first
incident of sexual assault occurred between the male student
and one of the female classmates in the bathroom during
"recycling time." 160 Even though the specific facts of the
incident never became entirely clear and the police
investigation was inconclusive, the district risk manager
investigating the case admitted that "insufficient supervision
on the part of our staff was clearly an issue that might have
allowed this to have occurred." 161 The court found that at this
point in the series of events "at a minimum, the District was
put on notice that it had potential problems with supervision"
of its developmentally delayed students. 162 As a result of this
first incident, the district developed a plan that would have
placed this particular male student under a high level of
supervision where he would be visually observed at all

157. G.C. ex rel. Counts v. N. Clackamas Sch. Dist., 651 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Or.
2009).
158. !d. at 1229.
159. !d. at 1226.
160. !d. at 12:l0~81.
161. !d. at 12il9 (stated in a November 15, 2004 memo by the district risk manager
in a "lengthy conversation" he had with a detective who worked on the KW case).
162. !d.
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times. 163 However, whether or not this constant supervision
actually occurred is disputed, and the next spring the plaintiff
female student of this case alleged that this same boy raped
her in the bathroom after sneaking past his teacher. 164
In analyzing this case, the district court's ruling did not
turn on one significant fact alone, but rather a compilation of
many different factors, such as the district's failure to "train its
administrators and teachers in the proper handling and
investigation of child abuse reports," failure to reveal in the
first investigation relevant records indicating this male student
was "sexually curious" in the past, failure to give weight to
knowledge that it had of an inappropriate touching incident on
the bus, and to the findings of the school psychologist
predicting this student was likely to engage in sexual
advances. 165 While school liability is not founded upon any one
single factor, school officials should still be aware of the weight
of each factor. For example, while "[t]he lack of training by
itself does not establish deliberate indifference to plaintiffs
rights," the court still found that "the District's child abuse
reporting and investigation training policies, or lack thereof,
[were] relevant in assessing how the District handled [the
student]'s allegation." 166
Although the district judge admits this was a "close case,"
the court was careful in its analysis and looked to circuit court
cases that closely followed Davis to guide its own decision. 167
The Counts court noted a First Circuit case, Fitzgerald u.
Barnstable School Community, where the court ruled that
"Title IX does not require educational institutions to take
heroic measures, to perform flawless investigations, to craft
perfect solutions, or adopt strategies advocated by parents." 168
Additionally, the Counts court noted that simply claiming that
a school district could have or should have done more "is
insufficient to establish deliberate indifference." 169

163. ld.
161. ld. at 1235 n.1.
165. Id. at 1240-41 ("the school psychologist noted that in an unstructured setting,
the likelihood of sexual advances hy A Y with his girlfriend, was a •;y or a '4' on a low to
high scale of 1 to 6").
166. ld. at 1239.
167. Id.at1241.
168. Jd. (citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 501 F.:-ld 165 (1st Cir. 2007)).
169. I d. (citing Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 188 F.cld 67, 7:l (1st Cir. 2007)).
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Contrast Counts with Ings-Ray v. School District of
Philadelphia where a district court granted the school district's
motion for summary judgment in response to a student-onstudent Title IX harassment claim after finding the district
"clearly did not act with deliberate indifference in responding
to plaintiff's allegations." 170 Similar to Counts, this case
involved a mentally disabled male student sexually assaulting
a disabled female classmate. However, in this case the male
student simply "touched plaintiff's behind while both students
were traveling on a school bus." 171 In response to this report,
the school immediately suspended the male student for three
days, transferred him out of the plaintiff's classes, and
arranged for supervision to occur in homeroom and the
hallways. 172 Additionally, the school arranged for a police
officer and a special interest group to present a program on
inappropriate touching to the entire student body. 173 While
these specific actions were tailored to the facts of the case, the
Ings-Ray case is an example of a school that successfully
shielded itself from Title IX liability.

D.

Responding to Inappropriate Behavior by Students with
Disabilities

When a sexual harassment incident occurs between two
students, school administrators can respond with any number
of disciplinary measures. In fact, the Davis standard does not
mandate one specific response, but rather articulates a
standard that the school "must merely respond to known peer
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable." 174
Additionally, the Davis court disagreed with the respondent's
demand that "nothing short of expulsion of every student
accused of misconduct involving sexual overtones would protect
school systems form liability or damages." 175 Furthermore,
when it comes to suspension and expulsion of students with
disabilities, school administrators are bound to the procedural
protections of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
170.
Pa. Apr.
171.
172.
17il.
174.
175.

lngs-Ray v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 02-CV-3615, 103 LRP 19220, at *1 (E.D.
30, 2003).
/d. at *2.
ld.
/d.
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 619 (1999).
/d. at 618 (citing Brief for Respondents at 16).
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(hereinafter "IDEA"), 176 and must act accordingly, even to
incidents involving the sexual harassment of another student.
Under IDEA, when a student misbehaves and the
disciplinary measure would result in a change of placement
(including suspension, expulsion, or even a change to a
different classroom), the school must hold a "manifestation
determination" within ten days to determine "if the conduct in
question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial
relationship to, the child's disability." 177 If it is determined that
the behavior is not a manifestation of the disability, then in a
case of sexual harassment (or any other misconduct), the school
may discipline the perpetrator as it would a student without a
disability. 178 However, if it is determined that the behavior is
connected to the disability, the school administration, working
in conjunction with teachers and parents, will come up with a
"behavioral intervention plan" (BIP) to address this
misconduct. 179 Under special circumstances involving weapons,
drug possession, or serious bodily injury of another student, a
school "may remove a student to an interim alternative
educational setting for not more than 45 school days without
regard to whether the behavior is determined to be a
manifestation of the child's disability." 1so In applying this
"special circumstances" rule to cases of severe sexual
harassment, "[a] critic could argue the sense of requiring such
a process for students who have already committed criminal
behavior such as weapon or drug offenses, or violent sexual
assault." 181 However, for most sexual harassment incidents of a
lesser severity, the "stay put" provision, given by the Supreme
Court in 1988 in Honig u. Doe, requires that the disabled
student remain in his or her current educational placement
and continue to receive the education services that his or her
IEP calls for, until a determination is made. 182

176. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S. C.§§ 1100-1150 (2005).
177. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Procedural Safeguards, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1115(k)(1)(E) (2011).
178. !d.§ 1115(k)(l).
179. !d.
180. !d. § 1115(k)(l)(G).
181. Terry Jean Seligmann, Not as Simple as ABC: Disciplining Children with
Disabilities Under the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 12 Awz. L. H"v. 77 n.151 (2000)
(commenting on IDEA, 20 U.S. C. § 1115(k)(l)).
182. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. :105 (1988).
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In summary, while a school cannot ignore incidents of
sexual harassment where the perpetrator is a student with a
disability, a school is not required to suspend or expel the
perpetrator if the disability played a role in the misconduct.
Rather, to the extent that a school can "offer students an
alternative educational setting in lieu of, rather than as a
consequence of, suspension or expulsion, the district can both
avoid the cost of individualized educational services and reach
students who may be heading for trouble before they are in
trouble." 183 However, when making decisions about placement
of the perpetrator, school officials should keep in mind the
rights of the plaintiff, especially if he or she is severely
disabled, as many disabled students live in fear of repeat
harassment, and in terror of having to face their perpetrator on
a daily basis in what should be a safe school environment.

E.

Notice and Actual Knowledge Under the Davis Standard

While Davis was monumental in establishing liability for
schools in peer harassment cases, it gives little guidance for
determining when a school district has crossed that line into
the liability arena. Prior to Davis, the standard for notice was
not as strict, stating "if [a] school district has constructive
notice of severe and repeated acts of sexual harassment by
fellow students, that may form the basis of a [T]itle IX
claim." 184 Then in 1998 the Supreme Court instituted the
"actual notice" (also referred to as "actual knowledge")
requirement in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District by holding that a school cannot be liable for damages
under Title IX "unless a school district official who at a
minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the
district's behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately
indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct" 185 A year later, Davis
extended this
same standard to student-on-student
harassment. Subsequent circuit court cases have shed light on
this standard, clarifying what it means for a school district to

18:3. Seligmann, supra note 181, at 113.
184. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 617 (1999) (citing NAOMI
GITTINS & JIM WALSH, NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION COUNCIL OF SCHOOL
ATTORNEYS, SEXUAL HA!{ASSMENT IN THE SCHOOLS: PREVENTING AND DEFENDING
ACAINST CLAIMS 15 (1990)).
185. Ge!JSer v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 521 U.S. 271 (1998).
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have "actual notice" at a level that qualifies their subsequent
action or inaction as "deliberately indifferent."
In arriving at its decision, the Davis Court looked at the
reasoning of a Seventh Circuit case decided in the prior year,
Doe v. University of Illinois, where a high school girl and her
parents made repeated complaints to school administration
when the girl was sexually harassed by a group of male
students, only to have the administration take "little or no
meaningful action to punish the sexual harassment or to
prevent
further
occurrences." 186
Additionally,
some
administrators told the girl that she was to blame for the
harassment and that her allegations of harassment might
injure the futures of the male students. 187 The campaign of
harassment never ceased and eventually the girl's parents
placed her in a private school. 188 In a suit brought by the girl's
parents against the school district for a Title IX violation the
court held that:
[A] Title IX fund recipient may be held liable for its failure to
take prompt, appropriate action in response to student-onstudent sexual harassment that takes place while the
students are involved in school activities or otherwise under
the supervision of school employees, provided the recipient's
responsible officials actually knew that the harassment was
taking place. 189

The Seventh Circuit in this case went on to specify that a
school district can be liable if "a school official who had actual
knowledge of the abuse was invested by the school board with
the duty to supervise the employee and the power to take
action that would end such abuse and failed to do so." 190 In
short, this case is imputing to the Davis standard the
requirement that a school official has actual knowledge, actual
notice, and the power to take action against the harassment.
However, if the "actual notice" standard requires a student
who has been the victim of sexual harassment to distinguish

186. Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 138 F.:ld 65:i, 655 (7th Cir. 1998).
187. ld.
188. ld.
189. ld. at 661.
190. ld. at 668 (citing Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 128 F.:ld 1014, 128 (7th Cir.
1997), where the court adopted a requirement of actual knowledge for teacher-onstudent sexual harassment and rejected Title IX liability based on a "knew or should
have known" standard).
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between which school personnel constitute those with the
"power to take action" and which employees do not, this could
render the standard unmanageable. The Office for Civil Rights
(hereinafter "OCR") under the United States Department of
Education has said "young students may not understand those
designations and may reasonably believe that an adult, such as
a teacher or the school nurse, is a person they can and should
tell about incidents of sexual harassment regardless of that
person's formal status in the school administration." 191 The
OCR has also articulated that forming an exhaustive list of
those employees who carry this power would be inappropriate.
Instead, the OCR provides guidance to schools listing factors,
considerations, and specific examples of what to do in a certain
factual scenarios. 192 Additionally, the OCR guidelines can help
administrators distinguish between what is actual sexual
harassment, and what is not. Recently, stories across the
country have sprung up where a six-year-old boy will be
suspended for kissing a girl on the cheek, or for other similar
conduct. 193 The OCR guidance notes that this type of behavior
would not be considered sexual harassment and goes on to say
that "school personnel should consider the age and maturity of
students when responding to allegations of sexual
harassment." 194
For students with disabilities, these considerations imbue
an even greater sense of responsibility on school officials to be
on the lookout for "actual notice" of peer sexual harassment
taking place in the school setting. Students with
"developmental delays may be perceived as 'easy targets' by
other students and adults in the school community." 195 These
students are considered easy prey for perpetrators, especially if
they lack the ability to respond appropriately to a harassment
situation. "Additionally, the individual may have difficulty
avoiding future negative interactions with the perpetrator,

191. U.S. DEPT. OF I<;IJUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HAW\SSMENT
GUIDANCE: HAI{ASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, 0'1'HER STUDENTS, OR
THIRD
PARTIES
(1997)
[hereinafter
OCR
GUIDELINES],
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar00.html.
192. !d.
19:~. Associated Press, Sex-harass Suspension of 1st Grader Stirs Debate,
MSNBC.COM (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11252421/ns/us_ncwseducation/.
191. OCR GUIDELINES, supra note 191.
195. Young, supra note 9, at 208.
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creating an ongoing cycle of sexual harassment." 196
Furthermore, if a student lacks the ability to verbally
communicate, whether due to a hearing impairment, or a
language barrier (also including those students for whom
English is not their first language), the school needs to have
some other avenue for students to report sexual harassment, or
at least for school officials to become aware of any possible
incidents of harassment against those students. Once aware,
school officials should take immediate action that is not
"clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." 197

F.

Implications for Same-Sex Harassment

While Davis held that Title IX liability extends to studenton-student harassment, it was silent on the issue of same-sex
harassment. The Supreme Court gave this idea a starting point
in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. where the Court
held that "sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII." 198 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has ruled in another Title VII workplace
discrimination case that where harassment is based on failure
to live up to stereotypical gender norms, it can be actionable
under Title VII, despite the harasser being void of any sexual
desire toward the victim. 199 However, the Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the specific claim of same-sex sexual harassment
under Title IX, although many lower federal courts and state
courts have addressed this issue.
In Patterson, the Sixth Circuit decision outlined in the first
portion of this article, the boy DP was verbally harassed by
other males on a frequent basis, with the harassment
escalating to an incident of sexual assault in the locker room. 200
The Sixth Circuit found there to be a genuine issue of material
fact as to the "deliberate indifference" of school officials in their
response to the harassment and remanded the case back to the
federal district court, the Eastern District of Michigan. The
district court subsequently found that the legal standard for
sexual harassment under Title IX was not met and held that

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Jd. at 210.
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. lld. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.3d 488, 4:l9-43 (6th Cir. 2009).
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the school district was not deliberately indifferent. 201 Rather,
the district court found that the harassment directed at DP
was "typical of middle school and high school behavior." 202 The
court cited the Supreme Court's Oncale Title VII decision by
stating: "Whether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of
actionable harassment thus 'depends on a constellation of
surrounding
circumstances,
expectations,
and
relationships."' 203 The court went on to explain that namecalling, even when targeted at gender differences, can never
rise to the level of the Davis standard, which demands that the
harassment be so "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
it denies its victims the equal access to education that Title IX
is designed to protect." 204
However, in exploring the boundaries of a Title IX claim on
the basis of same-sex sexual harassment, it is argued that
"such claims are equally viable under Title IX as they are
under Title VII." 205 However, most of the claims involving
same-sex harassment that appear today will involve sexual
assault or abuse more often than they will involve verbal or
mild physical harassment "based on the failure of a student to
live up to stereotypical gender expectations." 206 At the circuit
court level, a Title IX same-sex harassment claim has been
recognized where a male teacher molested several male
students. 207 At the federal district court level a Title IX claim
was allowed to proceed where "a male student who advocated
gay rights was physically and verbally abused by fellow male
classmates based on perceived homosexuality." 208 Another
district level Title IX case went forward involving the assault
and battery of a middle school student by his male classmate

201. Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., No. 05-714~:39, at *10 (E.D. Mich. July 1,
2010).
202. /d. at *9.
20:l. !d. (citing Oncale, 52:l U.S. at 82).
201. /d. (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651-52 (1999)).
205. Paul M. Secunda, At the Crossroads of Title IX and a New "IDEA": Why
!Jullyin,; Need Not be "A Normal Part of Growing Up" for Special Education Children,
12 DUKE,J. GENIJEI{L. & POL'Y 1,12 (2005).
206. !d. at 12.
207. Jd. at 12 n.71 (citing Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211 (5th Cir.
1998)).
208. /d. at 13 n.78 (citing Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 869
(N.D. Ohio 200~:3)).
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where the harassment was based on his perceived
homosexuality. 209
As for cases involving special education students and samesex harassment, there are very few. In addition to Patterson,
which was a circuit case, there is one district court decision
involving a Title IX claim for same-sex sexual harassment of a
student with disabilities which also fails to live up to the Davis
standard in the eyes of the court. 210 In this case, a twelve-year
old mildly retarded boy claims that his male classmate, who is
also mentally disabled, sexually assaulted him in the restroom
at school by performing anal sex on him. 211 Upon seeing the
two boys alone in the bathroom acting suspiciously, the teacher
immediately took the two students to the assistant principal.
However, school officials did not contact the parents and did
not launch an investigation until after the parents became
aware of the situation. 212 However, during this time, the
teacher made efforts to keep the two students separated in the
classroom. Once the investigation began, however, the
principal interviewed employees and students, held a meeting
with the parents, contacted Child Protective Services and the
police, and transferred the perpetrator to another school. 213
The court found that the responses of the school and the
principal were not "clearly unreasonable . . . in light of the
known circumstances" 214 and stated that even if the school
"could have taken swifter and more appropriate action, there is
no legal requirement of perfection." 215 The allegation of sexual
assault, even if proven true, was not sufficient to hold the
school liable, as the school responded reasonably to the
allegation. Furthermore, there were "no other incidents of
gender-related harassment alleged in any of Plaintiffs'
filings." 216 However, the court did find evidence of "prior
bullying, teasing, and name-calling" 217 but relied on the Davis

209. !d. at 5 n.:30 (citing Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165
(N.D. Cal. 2000)).
210. Wilson v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
211. !d. at 691.
212. !d.
21;). !d.
211. ld. at 69;) (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. I3d. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 618
(1999)).
215. Jd. at 694.
216. Id.
217. Jd.
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standard to declare that "[d]amages are not available for
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children,
however, even where these comments target differences in
gender." 218 In short, the district court seemed willing to
acknowledge that same-sex sexual assault would be enough to
find the school liable under Title IX in just the same way as
opposite-sex harassment, but that verbal or mild physical
harassment based on gender differences would not qualify for
Title IX protection. However, in the former case, the school's
actions would still have to rise to the level of deliberate
indifference in order for the court to find liability in a same-sex
sexual harassment claim.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Ever since the Supreme Court ruled in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools 219 that a private individual
could sue for damages under Title IX, the number of cases
claiming sexual harassment in the public schools have
increased dramatically. 220 With the addition of Gebser and
Davis to the mix, lower federal courts have built up a
"substantial body of sexual harassment law affecting school
districts." 221 For a school administrator just trying to get
through the tasks of each day, this giant body of potential
liability may feel like a dark cloud looming overhead. However,
there is a ray of hope: a school need not purge its entire system
of any potential future harassment incidents, nor must it carry
out with perfection a plan to stop all teenage hormones.
Rather, a school must simply "respond to known peer
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable." 222
With regards to special education students, however, school
officials need to be aware of the unique challenges and barriers
that may stand in the way of providing these students a safe
environment, free from the fear and terror of sexual assault,
especially for those students who have experienced sexual
assault in the past. A lack of understanding of the needs of
special education students is often the forerunner to situations
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

!d. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 618).
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
ALEXAN DE!{ & ALEXAN DEl{, supra note 5, at 537.
!d. at 5:38.
Davis, 526 U.S. at ()18.
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where those students' rights are diminished, and in severe
cases, trampled. School officials should also keep in mind that
often the perpetrator in a peer harassment situation is a
student with disabilities. When this occurs, school officials
should take care to act in accordance with the provisions of
IDEA and a student's own IEP. Case law, while not plentiful,
does exist for harassment claims and can be a guide to school
officials as they navigate the waters of Title IX liability. By
working together with other administrators and school
personnel, any school official can realize the success of
providing a harassment-free environment for every student,
regardless of that student's disability or limitations.

Annette Thacker

